Remarks by the Honorable John E. Keefe* at Seton
Hall University School of Law'
I have been asked to moderate the discussion regarding how a
plaintiff proves an alternative safer design case under the New Jersey
Model Jury Charge.' We will assume, for the purpose of today's
discussion, that the pending model charge that has been approved by
the Model Civil Jury Charge Committee, after much hard work and
discussion, will be approved by the Administrative Office of the
Courts for use by trial judges and lawyers in the near future.
Arguably, the concept of an alternative safer design as the
preferred method of proving product defect began in New Jersey
when the Legislature passed the Product Liability Act in 1987. The
Act, often referred to simply as the PLA, provides an absolute defense
for a manufacturer that can prove that, at the time its product
entered the marketplace, no other practical and technically feasible
alternative design would have prevented the harm incurred by the
plaintiff without substantially impairing the reasonably anticipated or
intended function of the product.3 This statutory defense became
known as the "state-of-the-art" defense and elevated Dean Wade's
risk4
utility factor number four to the status of an absolute defense.
The practical effect of the defense is to cause plaintiffs to
approach their cases from a different perspective than that used in
the typical design defect case. Under the balancing approach of the
risk-utility analysis, the global risks of the product are weighed against
Judge, NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division.
Editor's Note: These remarks are based upon a presentation given at Seton
Hall University School of Law's Seventh Annual Health Law Symposium on February
12, 1999.

See NEWJERSEY MODELJURY CHARGE ON DESIGN DEFECT (Proposed Official
Draft

1998).

2 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.58C-1
SSee id. § 2A:58G-3a(l).

(West 1987).

4 SeeJohn W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liabilityfor Products,76 Miss.
L.J. 825, 837
(1973). Wade includes "[t]he manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character
of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain
its utility" within a series of factors to balance in judging whether an item is unreasonably
dangerous. See id. The Supreme Court of NewJersey also has given due consideration
to Dean Wade's approach. See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 174, 386
A.2d 816, 826 (1978).
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the general, global benefits from having the product on the market.
Confronted with the state-of-the-art defense, however, plaintiffs are
forced to examine a more specific issue of whether a technologically
feasible, and economically practical, alternative design was available
at the time of marketing that would have avoided the injury to the
plaintiff. If able to present such proofs, the plaintiff has met the
anticipated defense and has raised a jury question. As a practical
matter, the vast majority of reported design defect cases have utilized
this approach to proving design defect since the PLA was adopted.
Thus, the black letter law of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability (Restatement (Third)) on the subject of design
defects, that proof of an alternative safer design is the preferred and
generally accepted method of proving product defect, is in accord
with existent New Jersey case law.5 If that proposition was ever in
doubt, the recent case of Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 6 in an

opinion written by Justice Pollock, dispelled any skepticism. In Lewis,
Justice Pollock cited comment f of section 2 of the Restatement
(Third), writing, "To succeed on his design-defect claim, plaintiff was
required to prove that a practical and feasible alternative design
existed that would have reduced or prevented his harm."' The court
then stated that, to determine whether plaintiffs proposed
alternative design met that test, "the jury was required to perform a
risk-utility analysis.""
Lewis, however, was a case in which the plaintiff chose to prove a
design defect claim within the context of an alternative safer design
claim. The question remains whether a plaintiff in New Jersey still
has the option of proving the case simply by attempting to prove that
the product's risks outweigh its utility in the global or macro sense
and, thus, avoid the practical problems stemming from the statutory
state-of-the-art defense. The answer is unclear. Justice Pollock's
earlier comments notwithstanding, the Lewis court, in discussing who
has the burden of proof in such matters, stated, "A plaintiff must
prove either that the product's risks outweighed its utility or that the
product could have been designed in an alternative manner so as to
minimize or eliminate the risk of harm." 9
The Restatement (Third), on the other hand, limits use of the
CompareRESrATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODuCrS LIABILInY § 2(b) (1997) with
Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 155 N.J. 544, 560, 715 A.2d 967, 975 (1998).
6 155 N.J. 544, 715 A.2d 967 (1998).
7 Lewis, 155 N.J. at 560, 715 A.2d at 975 (1998).
8 Id.
9 Id. at 570, 715 A.2d at 980 (emphasis added).
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risk-utility analysis in its macro or global sense to certain categories of
cases in which the product manifestly exhibits such low social utility
and such a significant degree of danger that the design of the
product is unreasonable without proof of an alternative design. 0
That concept actually tracks the exception to the state-of-the-art
defense found in the PLA. The PLA provides that a defendant
cannot assert the state-of-the-art defense when the plaintiff establishes
by clear and convincing evidence to the court's satisfaction all three
of the following factors:
1) The product is egregiously unsafe or ultra-hazardous; 2) The
ordinary user or consumer of the product cannot reasonably be
expected to have knowledge of the product's risks, or the product
poses risk of serious injury to persons other than the user or
consumer; and 3) the product has little or no usefulness."
What does this mean in practical terms for a lawyer attempting
to put together a design defect case? New Jersey law is in agreement
with section 2 of the Restatement (Third) and its comments, but
approaches the subject from a slightly different angle.
More
succinctly, New Jersey law requires that plaintiffs, except in the
unusual case, must prove a safer alternative design.
The recent New Jersey appellate division case of Truchan v.
Nissan Motor Corp. in US.A.12 illustrates the ways of proving the
alternative safer design case. In Truchan, the plaintiff suffered severe
injuries when the automobile in which she was a rear-seat passenger
struck a utility pole. The impact with the utility pole was apparently
caused by the driver's inebriation and occurred at a relatively low rate
of speed, estimated at between twenty-two and twenty-eight miles per
hour." After the accident, the plaintiff was found seated, wearing a
two-point, lap-belt restraint, and leaning against the rear window.
The driver and front seat passenger were not wearing seat belts at all;
however, both sustained relatively minor injuries. The plaintiff did
not fare as well. Her spinal column literally was ripped in half, thus
disabling all parts of her body below the navel. 14 A post-accident
physical examination of the plaintiff revealed a deep bruise
beginning on the area below her navel and extending across her
right side, ending on her right flank. The bruise, according to the
treating doctor, was the result of blunt trauma caused by plaintiff's
10 See RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrIY

SSee N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-58C-3b (West 1987).
316 N.J. Super. 554, 720 A.2d 981 (App. Div. 1998).
is See id. at 558, 720 A.2d at 983.
14 See id. at 558-59, 720 A.2d
at 983.
12

§ 2 cmL

e (1997).
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violent contact with the lap belt. The doctor attributed the cause of
plaintiffs extensive internal injury to the lap belt holding her pelvis
in the seat, while her torso was permitted to flex forward
unrestrained. 5
After settling a lawsuit with the owner and driver of the car, the
plaintiff proceeded to trial against Nissan Corporation.
She
contended that Nissan equipped the automobile with a defectively
designed lap belt and failed to warn passengers of the potential for
enhanced injuries if worn above the lower abdomen. The plaintiff
contended that she was seated in an upright position at the time of
the accident. "The experts unanimously agreed that to minimize the
possibility of injury, a rear seat occupant should wear a lap belt low
on the hips, with the belt positioned on the anterior-superior portion
of the passenger's iliac crest."' 6 Experts for the plaintiff asserted that
Nissan, contrary to federal motor vehicle standards, had installed the
seat-belt anchors in an asymmetrical manner, causing the lap
restraint to ride up too high on the passenger's abdomen. The
plaintiff contended that a safer two-point lap belt, which would not
rise above the passenger's hips, was a feasible alternative. The
plaintiff's experts also testified that a three-point, shoulder-harness
lap belt, similar to those that are typically provided for the
driver and
7
front-seat passenger, would have prevented the injuries.1
In addition to these specific proofs relative to safer alternative
design, the plaintiff contended that the lap belt was inherently
dangerous and breached consumers' reasonable expectations of
safety. Secondly, the plaintiff claimed that Nissan failed to warn users
of the dangerous qualities of the lap restraint. Nissan experts
testified that the two-point restraint complied with all applicable
federal standards.
Based on the nature of the bruises on the
plaintiffs body, and contrary to her testimony, Nissan's experts
opined that the plaintiff was in a slumped position tilting forty-five to
ninety degrees to her left with the seat belt positioned over her navel
when the accident occurred." Nissan's experts, therefore, concluded
that her chosen position in the vehicle was the proximate cause of
the catastrophic injury sustained. With regard to the three-point

See id. at 558, 720 A.2d at 983.
Id. at 559, 720 A.2d at 983. The iliac crest is that portion of the hip bone in
which large quantities of bone marrow are concentrated.
The On-line Medical
Dictionary
(visited
Oct.
22,
1999)
<http://www.graylab.ac.uk/cgibin/omd?iliac+crest>.
17 See id.
18 See Truchan, 316 N.J. Super. at 559, 720 A.2d at 983.
15

16
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restraint claim, the defense experts opined that the plaintiff would
have sustained the same injuries had this style of restraint been
used." These experts stated that the shoulder belt would have locked
upon the force of the collision, and "would have 'strategically . . .
followed the lie of the lap belt.' 20 The defense experts additionally
concluded "that the torso would have 'follow[ed] a horizontal
arc,'
2
tearing the spinal column and resulting in the same injuries., 1
The judge instructed the jury on all three of the plaintiffs defect
theories: alternative safer design, consumer expectations, and failure
to warn. The opinion does not tell us what instructions the judge
gave the jury on the consumer expectation test for design defect. As
for the alternative safer design theory, the judge instructed the jury
that the "[p]laintiff must also prove .

.

. that there was available an

alternative safer design, practicable under the circumstances, which
would have eliminated the alleged defect in the internal restraint
system and [would have] prevent[ed] her from being injured to the
extent she was., 22 In addition to this charge, the judge instructed the
jury on proximate causation. The judge told the jury that "proximate
cause means that the defect in the product was a substantial factor,
which singly or in combination with another cause, created plaintiff's
injuries."23 In another part of the charge, the judge instructed the
jury that if it "were to conclude that 'plaintiff would have been
injured . . . as she was, even if the vehicle had been designed

differently, [then Nissan would be] entitled to a verdict because the
alleged defect2 4 ... could not have been a substantial factor in causing
her injuries.'

Despite the fact that the case went to the jury on three separate
theories of product defect and on the critically disputed fact issue of
whether the plaintiff was seated upright or slouched, the trial judge
asked the jury only two questions. First, Was the product defective
and, second, Was the defect a proximate cause of the plaintiffs
injuries? 2 5 The jury found that the product was defective but that the
defect was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. The
plaintiff then moved for a new trial, and the motion was granted
based on the trial court's cryptic observation that the verdict was
19
20
21

23
24
25

See id. at 559-60, 720 A.2d at 983.
Id. at 560, 720 A-2d at 983.
Id., 720 A.2d at 983-84.
Id., 720 A.2d 984.
Id. at 561, 720 A.2d at 984.
Truchan, 316 N.J. Super. at 561, 720 A.2d at 984.
See id.
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against the weight of the evidence and resulted in a miscarriage of
justice. Nissan's motion for leave to appeal was granted, as was the
plaintiff's cross-appeal. 6
The appellate division concluded that a new trial was warranted.
The appellate division held that the trial judge's interrogatories to
the jury invited an inconsistent verdict. Finding that, although a
rational explanation for the jury's answers could be given, the
appellate division was not satisfied that the jury was instructed
properly so as to legitimize its conclusion that the product was
defective, but was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
The appellate division pointed out that in the typical alternative safer
design case, the issue of product defect subsumes the question of
proximate causation.28 That is so because the jury is instructed that a
product is defective only if the risk of harm to the plaintiff could have
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of an alternative design
that was both practical and feasible, the omission of which renders
the product not reasonably safe. If, under that instruction, a jury
finds product defect, that jury also has determined the issue of
proximate cause because the jury has already found that an29
alternative design would have prevented the plaintiffs harm.
Consequently, to ask the jury a second time whether the product
defect was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries invites an
inconsistent result.-" The jury verdict in this case reflected either that
the jury failed to appreciate that nuance or that the jury actually was
focusing on another issue, such as whether the product was defective
because it failed to warn plaintiff to sit upright in the vehicle while
wearing the lap belt. The absence of the warning was of no moment,
however, because the plaintiff would not have heeded it even if it
were given.
As stated earlier, the judge instructed the jury on all three of
plaintiffs defect theories. The verdict sheet did not disclose the
theory upon which the jury decided. The case raises many questions
that I will simply articulate now, but not answer. A series of questions
come to my mind when I read Truchan in light of the issue of proving
product defect after the Restatement (Third):
(1) Is the consumer expectation test incompatible with an
alternative safer design case? The Model Civil Jury Charge
See
See
28 See
29 See
so See
26
27

id.
id. at 562, 720 A.2d at 985.
id. at 565, 720 A.2d at 986.
id. at 566, 720 A.2d at 987.
Truchan, 316 N.J. Super. at 568, 720 A.2d at 988.

1999]

REMARKS BYJUDGE KEEFE
and the Restatement
excludes the other.

271

(Third) seem to suggest that one

(2) Is this theory something that a plaintiff tactically wants to
pursue?
(3) How does an attorney present proof on a person's
expectation about seat belts, other than personal opinion?
(4) Will such proofs tend to distract the jury rather than focus it
on the primary issue?
(5) Should the judge have asked the jury to answer a specific
interrogatory on the fact issue of how the plaintiff was
positioned in the car?
(6) What significance would it have had if the jury found that the
plaintiff was seated upright, as she claimed to be?
(7) What significance would it have had if the jury found that the
plaintiff was either lying down or tilting to the left at a fortyfive degree angle?
(8) The opinion appears to have been written as a misuse case.
What benefit does 31a defendant derive from interjecting
misuse into the case?
(9) When alternative safer design is the method of proving a
product defect, is evidence regarding other risk-utility factors
relevant?
(10) Are risk-utility factors one (its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole) and three (the availability of a substitute
product that would meet the need and not be as unsafe)
relevant in this context?
(11) Are factors two, four, five, six, and seven any more than a
particularized restatement of Learned Hand's formula for
a1In New Jersey, knowledge of the risk that the manufacturer knew that the
plaintiff could have injured herself as she did is imputed to the manufacturer if the
product is being used in its intended manner or a reasonably foreseeable manner.
This is perhaps another way in which New Jersey case law differs somewhat from the
Restatement (Third).
Section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) addresses the
"foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product," suggesting that proof of foreseeability
of the harm is the plaintiff's burden, although the plaintiff may have been using the
product in the manner intended. See RESTATEMENT (TMiRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILrnY § 2 cmL a (1997).
Surveying jurisprudence on the topic, the Restatement
(Third) found, "Most courts agree that, for the liability system to be fair and efficient,
the balancing of risks and benefits in judging product design and marketing must be
done in light of the knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance techniques reasonably
attainable at the time of distribution." Id. If, on the contrary, the product is being
misused, the plaintiff has the burden of proving objective foreseeability of the misuse
as well as the availability of a reasonable and practical design to meet the anticipated
misuse.
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imposing a tort duty?1

(12) Are not the proofs offered under those factors no more than
an attempt to show the relative magnitude of the risk, the
gravity of the anticipated injuries, and the fairness of
requiring the defendant to bear the cost of avoiding the risk
that caused injury to the plaintiff?
(13) What kind of evidence do you envision being offered under
the remaining relevant factors?
As you can see, this issue has raised a multitude of questions.
Now let's hear our distinguished panel's insights on this interesting
topic.

32 See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1947). Judge
Hand's formula "proposed that whether an actor's conduct was negligent should
depend on whether the burden of a precaution was greater than the gravity of the
injury discounted by the probability that the injury would occur in the absence of the
precaution .... " Michael Well, Scientific Policymaking and the Torts Revolution: The
Revenge of the Ordinary Observer, 26 GA. L. REV. 725, 731 (1992).

